Argumentation Schemes and Communities of Argumentational Practice by Aberdein, Andrew
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 8
Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM - Jun 6th, 5:00 PM
Argumentation Schemes and Communities of
Argumentational Practice
Andrew Aberdein
Florida Institute of Technology
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been
accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact
scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Andrew Aberdein, "Argumentation Schemes and Communities of Argumentational Practice" ( June 3, 2009). OSSA Conference Archive.
Paper 1.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/papersandcommentaries/1
 
Aberdein, A. (2009). Argumentation Schemes and Communities of Argumentational Practice. In: 
J. Ritola (Ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-10), 
Windsor, ON: OSSA.  
Copyright © 2009, the author. 
 
Argumentation Schemes and Communities of Argumentational 
Practice 
 
ANDREW ABERDEIN 
 
Humanities and Communication 
Florida Institute of Technology 
150 West University Blvd, Melbourne  
Florida 32901-6975 
USA 
aberdein@fit.edu 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Is it possible to distinguish communities of arguers by tracking the argumentation schemes 
they employ? There are many ways of relating schemes to communities, but not all are productive. 
Attention must be paid not only to the admissibility of schemes within a community of argumentational 
practice, but also to their comparative frequency. Two examples are discussed: informal mathematics, a 
convenient source of well-documented argumentational practice, and anthropological evidence of non-
standard reasoning.  
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1. WHAT IS A COMMUNITY OF ARGUMENTATIONAL PRACTICE?  
 
My use of the phrase “community of argumentational practice” consciously echoes the 
discussion of communities of practice initiated by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (1991), 
which has become influential in the theory of knowledge management. While I shall not 
attempt to follow their methodology in any detail, their characterization of a community 
of practice provides a convenient starting point. Such communities are defined by three 
components: domain, community, and practice. The domain comprises the subject matter 
of interest to the community, the community is the people employing the practice, and the 
practice represents a shared body of relevant techniques:  
 
The term practice [ denotes a set of socially defined ways of doing things in a specific domain: 
a set of common approaches and shared standards that create a basis for action, communication, 
problem solving, performance and accountability. These communal resources include a variety of 
knowledge types: cases and stories, theories, rules, frameworks, models, principles, tools, experts, 
articles, lessons learned, best practices, and heuristics. They include both the tacit and the explicit 
aspects of the community’s knowledge. [ It also embodies a certain way of behaving, a 
perspective on problems and ideas, a thinking style, and even in many cases an ethical stance. In 
this sense, a practice is a sort of mini-culture that binds the community together. (Wenger et al. 
2002, pp. 38 f.)  
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Of course, the practice may be concerned with just about anything: the examples 
discussed by Wenger et al. (2002) range from oil prospecting to flute making. However, 
we may observe that several of the general features identified above have an inferential or 
argumentational flavour: for example, problem solving, rules, models, heuristics, and 
thinking style. Thus, communities of practice, as envisaged by Lave and Wenger, have an 
argumentational dimension. Nonetheless, this does not suffice to identify them as 
communities of argumentational practice, since they are unlikely to be individuated by 
their argumentational practice alone: perhaps the flute makers and oil prospectors reason 
in homologous ways. Conversely, members of a single community of practice may be 
divided by their conflicting argumentational norms: indeed, Wenger et al. (2002, p. 123) 
address this as a (superable) obstacle to globally distributed communities of practice. 
The tripartite structure of domain, community and practice may be adapted to 
characterize communities of argumentational practice. Logic is often said to be domain 
independent, and some communities of argumentational practice may be defined without 
regard to domain: their members could use their distinctive argumentational strategies to 
discuss anything and everything. However, as Stephen Toulmin observed long ago 
(1958), informal reasoning is tied to its field much more closely than formal reasoning. 
There are fields that invite specific argumentational approaches, such as legal reasoning, 
or mathematical reasoning. But Toulmin has been criticized for the sketchiness of his 
field concept:  
 
Toulmin never says precisely what counts as a field. He gives examples like law, medicine, 
science, and engineering. He uses cognate terms like forum of argumentation, rational enterprise, 
and context. But so far as I can tell, he never gives a precise definition of any of these terms. Since 
so much of Toulmin’s approach depends upon the concept of a field, the failure to define it 
carefully seems to me a serious lacuna. (Johnson 1996, p. 139, emphases in original)  
 
This lacuna has been filled in a variety of ways. Whereas some theorists have effectively 
identified field with domain, others have stressed sociological features, such as 
community and practice (Bermejo-Luque 2006, p. 73, canvasses the alternatives). This 
gives rise to further problems:  
 
Toulmin’s notion of field raised the specter of relativism, with field-dependent standards of 
evaluation. The problem becomes more acute if fields are understood as the discourse of a 
particular community, whose members would be free to set standards. (Freeman 2006, p. 98) 
 
Communities of argumentational practice have much in common with this richer 
version of Toulmin’s field concept, since they too may contain a standard-setting 
community. However, the relativistic spectre should be exorcised by the following 
considerations. Firstly, membership in communities of practice is not exclusive: many 
individuals operate successfully in multiple, overlapping communities simultaneously. 
“Code switching” between different communities is commonplace and seemingly 
unproblematic. This suggests the possibility of intersubjective comparison. Secondly, 
standards of evaluation are not exclusively field-dependent: there is no requirement that 
only the standards developed within a community should be applied to the products of 
that community. Thirdly, as I shall argue below, the practices of different communities 
may be articulated using a common apparatus: that of argumentation schemes. 
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2. ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 
 
Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns of reasoning. Their use has recently 
become influential in the analysis and evaluation of argument. While deductive inference 
schemata may be thought of as special cases of argumentation schemes, most attention 
has been paid to defeasible schemes typical of informal reasoning. A recent survey 
identifies ninety-six different schemes, most of which may ultimately be understood as 
more or less specialized instances of the very general scheme of Defeasible Modus 
Ponens:  
 
As a rule, if P, then Q. 
P. 
It is not the case that there is an exception to the rule that if P, then Q. 
Therefore, Q. (Walton et al. 2008, p. 366)  
 
For practical purposes, schemes are presented with much greater specificity. Moreover, 
the defeasible nature of the reasoning is not made explicit amongst the premises, but 
captured by an additional device, critical questions, which point to possible exceptions. 
For example, this is a scheme for Argument from Analogy:  
 
Similarity Premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2.  
Base Premise: A is true (false) in case C1.  
Conclusion: A is true (false) in case C2.  
Critical Questions:  
1. Are there differences between C1 and C2 that would tend to undermine the 
force of the similarity cited?   
2. Is A true (false) in C1?   
3. Is there some other case C3 that is also similar to C1, but in which A is false 
(true)? (Walton et al. 2008, p. 315)  
 
In the remainder of this paper I shall explore how argumentation schemes may be related 
to communities of argumentational practice. 
 
3. EXAMPLES 
 
Further progress on a positive definition of communities of argumentational practice 
requires careful study of a diverse range of examples. Within the scope of a single paper 
this range must be substantially abbreviated. The examples below are drawn from two 
areas. Firstly, mathematicians have a long history of carefully documenting their own 
argumentational practices. Moreover, comparatively little of that practice is conducted in 
exclusively formal terms: truly formalized mathematics only became viable in the 
nineteenth century and remains a minority activity. Hence informal mathematics provides 
a convenient source of well-documented communities of argumentational practice. 
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Secondly, some communities have attracted attention for their ostensibly heterodox 
argumentational behaviour. In particular, the reasoning practices that some 
anthropologists have reported from certain “tribal” communities have been explained as 
demonstrating endorsement of a nonclassical logic. More recently, the argumentational 
activities of some internet-based communities have attracted similar scrutiny. 
 
3.1  Consequentia Mirabilis 
 
Gerolamo Saccheri, the inadvertent anticipator of non-Euclidean geometry, provides a 
first illustration of the significance of communities of practice in mathematical reasoning. 
In both his logic textbook of 1697 and his more famous attempt to derive Euclid’s 
parallel postulate in 1735, Saccheri makes conspicuous use of the following deductive 
argumentation scheme:  
 
If P is false, then P is true. 
Therefore, P is true.  
 
As William and Martha Kneale observe, this enthusiasm reflected a wider practice: 
 
Almost certainly the source of [Saccheri’s] inspiration was [an annotation in] the widely read 
edition of Euclid published in 1574 by Clavius [ And his attention may have been directed to 
the relevant scholium by his Jesuit teachers. For Clavius himself had belonged to the Society of 
Jesus, and it seems that the argument on which he wrote his comment had a vogue among the 
members in the seventeenth century as the consequentia mirabilis1. (Kneale and Kneale 1962, p. 
347) 
 
Reflection on this example should eliminate the naïve thought that the practice of 
different communities might be individuated by listing either the schemes which they use 
or the schemes with which their systems are consistent. Neither approach would capture 
what was distinctive about the inferential practice of seventeenth century Jesuit logicians. 
For consequentia mirabilis is admissible in any system that admits modus ponens and 
reductio, and actually used in many such systems, including that of Euclid (in the proof 
of proposition IX.12), as Clavius’s annotation indicates. But those systems are not 
distinguished by partiality towards this scheme. What is distinctive is the disproportionate 
use of the scheme, and such references as Saccheri’s description of it as “a very beautiful 
way of proving these same truths without any assumption” or Girolamo Cardano’s as “the 
most wonderful thing that has been discovered since the beginning of the world” (Kneale 
and Kneale 1962, pp. 346 f.). Accounts of the relation of schemes to communities of 
practice must document not just the schemes used, but also their frequency of use and any 
overt commentary on their use. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1The Kneales cite research by Jan Łukasiewicz into seventeenth century Polish Jesuit logicians in support 
of this point. 
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3.2  Euclid  
 
A second example of a mathematical community of argumentational practice is the proof 
methods employed in Euclid’s Elements. It may seem odd to identify a single work by a 
single author, however influential, as a community of practice. But Euclid was not 
writing an original monograph. Rather his work was expressly designed to document the 
most fundamental mathematical techniques developed over the preceding two centuries 
of Greek mathematics. Knowledge management professionals identify building and 
organizing knowledge repositories as one of the key objectives for communities of 
practice (Wenger et al. 2002 pp. 102 ff.). Euclid’s appointment at Alexandria, coincident 
with the establishment of its celebrated library, demonstrates the institutional support 
which Ptolemy I, his employer, was prepared to lend to the construction of a knowledge 
repository for the practice of geometry. Much of that repository survives in the pages of 
the Elements. This makes it possible for us to extrapolate the practice that gave rise to 
that work. 
One conspicuous aspect is Euclid’s avoidance of purely logical inferences. For 
example, he proves propositions I.6 (If in a triangle two angles be equal to one another, 
the sides which subtend the equal angles will also be equal to one another) and I.19 (In 
any triangle the greater angle is subtended by the greater side) geometrically. However, 
as Augustus De Morgan observes, these propositions may be derived from their 
converses I.5 (In isosceles triangles the angles at the base are equal to one another, and, if 
the equal straight lines be produced further, the angles under the base will be equal to one 
another) and I.18 (In any triangle the greater side subtends the greater angle) as follows: 
 
Let there be  propositions  X, Y and Z—of which it is the property that one or 
the other must be true, and one only. Let there be three other propositions P, Q 
and R of which it is also the property that one, and one only, must be true. Let it 
be a connexion of those assertions that:  
when X is true, P is true, 
when Y is true, Q is true, 
when Z is true, R is true.  
Consequence: then it follows that,  
when P is true, X is true, 
when Q is true, Y is true, 
when R is true, Z is true.  
(De Morgan 1847, cited in Heath 2006, p. 132) 
 
The inference which De Morgan sets out here is a deductive argumentation scheme, but 
one that Euclid declines to employ. It is justified by repeated application of Aristotle’s 
operation of contraposition.2  Hence, we could reduce this scheme to the rather simpler 
deductive argumentation scheme for contraposition:  
 
When P is true, Q is true. 
                                                 
2Since YQ and ZR, then, by contraposition, QY and RZ, and by the constraint on the truth of 
the two sets of propositions, P(Q&R) and X(Y&Z). Therefore, P(Q&R)(Y&Z)X, and 
similarly for the other two cases. 
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Therefore, when Q is false, P is false.  
 
This scheme, although acknowledged as valid by Aristotle, is not to be found anywhere 
in Euclid either (De Morgan 1966, p. 174). Although one might complain that Euclid 
could have spared his readers the bother of proving I.6 and I.19 if he had adopted this 
scheme, it could just as readily be argued that Euclid followed the more sensible path—
this “merely logical deduction” is a fair bit of trouble. Thus Euclid’s practice may have 
been well adapted to his purposes. The moral of this story is that there are deductive 
argumentation schemes that are consistent with the argumentational practice of the 
Elements, some of which may be found in works of logic presumably available to Euclid, 
but which have no part in his practice. The avoidance of a scheme may be characteristic 
of a practice, even if the scheme would be admissible within the logical system central to 
that practice. 
A further illustrative case drawn from Euclid concerns his “Common Notion 4,” 
that “Things which coincide with one another are equal to one another” (Heath 2006, p. 
72). (Incidentally, the characterization of this axiom as a “common notion,” common that 
is to mathematics as a whole, not just geometry, is an explicit appeal to a field-invariant 
standard of evaluation.) Common Notion 4 gives rise to the method of superposition, 
which might be expressed as the following argumentation scheme:  
 
One figure may be superposed on another so that its vertices and edges 
perfectly coincide. 
Therefore, the two figures are identical.  
 
This scheme may succeed as a practical test, but it would not be accepted as a sound 
mathematical proof in modern practice (Heath 2006, p. 97). Euclid himself seems to have 
sensed that the method was suboptimal. As Heath observes,  
 
it is clear that Euclid disliked the method and avoided it wherever he could, e.g. in I.26, where he 
proves the equality of two triangles which have two angles respectively equal to two angles and 
one side of the one equal to the corresponding side of the other. It looks as though he found the 
method handed down by tradition [ and followed it, in the few cases where he does so, only 
because he had not been able to see his way to a satisfactory substitute. But seeing how much of 
the Elements depends on I.4 [which Euclid proves by superposition], directly or indirectly, the 
method can hardly be regarded as being, in Euclid, of only subordinate importance; on the 
contrary, it is fundamental. (Heath 2006, p. 73) 
 
From this example we can arrive at a second moral: the presence of a scheme within a 
practice is not sufficient to identify the role that scheme plays. The scheme may only be 
used reluctantly, when it cannot be avoided. Conversely, the infrequency of a scheme’s 
use need not imply that it is deprecated in the practice. Its use may be limited for other, 
more benign reasons. 
 
3.3 The Azande 
 
The heterodox behaviour reported by some ethnographers provides a further source of 
ostensibly well-documented communities of argumentational practice. The most widely 
discussed example is the subject of Evans-Pritchard’s classic 1937 study, Witchcraft, 
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Oracles and Magic among the Azande. For example, Zande reasoners would reject the 
following argument:  
 
All and only witches have witchcraft-substance. 
Witchcraft-substance is always inherited by the same-sexed children of a witch. 
 
The Zande clan is a group of persons related biologically to one another through the male 
line. 
 
Man A of clan C is a witch. 
Therefore, every man in clan C is a witch. (R. C. Jennings’s reconstruction of 
Evans-Pritchard, in da Costa et al. 1998, p. 42)  
 
Since they would accept the premises of this argument, but deny the conclusion, its 
apparent validity suggests that they are committed to both the conclusion and its 
negation, and thereby to a contradiction. Several proposals have been made for the 
resolution of this paradox. These range from the mundane suggestion that the Azande 
may not actually accept all the premises, to the more esoteric proposals that they may 
employ some form of non-classical logic, whether to treat some of the premises as non-
truth-valued, or even to tolerate inconsistencies.  
However, Zande inferential behaviour might be better explained by a preference 
for non-deductive argumentation schemes. This does less violence to their reported 
statements than would be required for them to be represented as employing classical logic 
consistently, and less violence to our intuitions than endorsement of a non-classical logic. 
Specifically, several of the inferential steps required for a derivation of the conclusion of 
this argument, such as that from “Every man in clan C has witchcraft-substance” to 
“Every man in clan C is a witch,” rely on the deductive scheme of modus ponens. If this 
is understood instead as exhibiting Walton’s scheme of defeasible modus ponens, then the 
conclusion would only follow in the absence of exceptions. But at several such junctures 
Evans-Pritchard records possible exceptions: for example, witchcraft-substance is 
sometimes “cool,” in which case its possession does not make a man a witch (da Costa et 
al. 1998, p. 51). Thus, on this analysis, the Azande would be right to reject the 
conclusion, despite accepting (defeasibly) the premises. 
Of course, this begs the question of whether the Zande acceptance of the premises 
should be understood defeasibly. Is this the best interpretation of their argumentational 
practice, or is it at least as tendentious as the ascription to them of a non-classical logic?  
One answer to this question may be to observe that the interpretation suggested here is 
essentially identical to that employed in the analysis of much more familiar communities 
of argumentational practice. For example, when I observe that “All dogs have four legs,” 
“Lucky is a dog” and “Lucky has three legs,” I do not feel motivated to endorse 
paraconsistent logic. Rather, I would defend my first claim as a defeasible generalization 
about dogs, which holds so widely as to be practically useful, despite occasional 
exceptions, such as the misnamed Lucky. Defeasible modus ponens would not support 
the erroneous inference that “Lucky has four legs,” and is thereby a better fit for my 
actual reasoning than modus ponens. Despite its more exotic provenance and subject 
matter, the Zande example may be resolved in exactly the same manner. 
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One moral of this example is the importance of interpretation of argumentational 
behaviour in the analysis of communities of argumentational practice. Particularly when 
dealing with participants from unfamiliar cultures, there can be considerable scope for 
disagreement over how best to interpret the observed behaviour. Even the strategy 
pursued here, of stressing continuities with more familiar practices, is not beyond dispute 
(da Costa et al. 1998, p. 50). I shall not attempt to recapitulate the lengthy debate over the 
use of such principles of charity as constraints on translation (see Quine 1960; da Costa et 
al. 1998, pp. 48 ff.; and cf. Walton et al. 2008, p. 193). However, the assumptions I have 
made here are purposefully modest. 
 
3.4  The Internet 
 
A source of argumentational idiosyncrasies closer to home than the tribes of 1930s 
central Africa is the internet. Argument in many online communities is noted for 
rebarbative mutual hostility. However, some internet communities have developed 
explicit rules designed to exclude less attractive practices. A well-known example is 
“Godwin’s Law of Nazi Analogies: As an online discussion grows longer, the probability 
of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one” (Godwin 1994). Latterly, 
Godwin’s Law is often stated as an explicitly argumentational norm, stipulating that the 
first person to mention Hitler has lost the argument. As such it may be understood as 
mandating an answer to the first critical question for the Argumentation Scheme for 
Argument from Analogy stated above: for most domains, there are always differences 
between C1 and C2 that tend to undermine the force of the similarity cited, when C2 is 
Hitler.3 This example demonstrates two features of communities of argumentational 
practice: that the practice can evolve (or devolve) over time, and that the agency of 
change may be indirect. Godwin describes how he “seeded Godwin’s Law in any 
newsgroup or topic where I saw a gratuitous Nazi reference,” which in time seemed to 
have reduced the incidence of such references (Godwin 1994). But the Law as originally 
formulated is (a satiric version of) an observed law of nature, not an explicit norm of 
argumentation. Had Godwin just asserted such a norm, he may not have had such 
success. 
On the other hand, some off-putting argumentational behaviour may be defensible 
within an appropriate context. As one recent study observes, structural factors in the 
design of online environments, such as anonymity, “lack of rules for holding the floor, 
multiple concurrent discussion threads, and limitations on space [ invite alternative 
forms of argumentative dialogue” (Weger and Aakhus, 2003, p. 31). The type of dialogue 
in which an argumentation scheme is deployed can make a big difference to the way it is 
evaluated, as proponents of the argumentation scheme approach acknowledge: “In 
addition to the argumentation scheme component, a dialectical component is needed 
representing other relevant factors of the text and context of dialogue in a given case” 
(Walton et al. 2008, p. 218). Here, “context of dialogue” refers to the dialogue types 
discussed by Walton in earlier work, including critical discussion, negotiation, inquiry, 
deliberation, information seeking, and quarrel (Walton and Krabbe 1995, p. 66). This list 
                                                 
3There are, of course, domains wherein analogies with Hitler are legitimate, such as discussions of 
genocide or military defeat. 
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is not exhaustive, hence we may propose addenda, such as the “wit testing” dialogue 
which has been suggested to be characteristic of some online environments (Weger and 
Aakhus 2003, p. 35). What might count elsewhere as fallacious ad hominem reasoning 
may be legitimate in wit testing dialogues.  
This example suggests that the argumentational practice of a community can be 
constrained by structural factors, and that an account of the practice will include dialogue 
types as well as argumentation schemes. Although the practice of some communities may 
be restricted to a single dialogue type, others will be concerned with arguments in more 
than one context and perhaps the relationships between the two. For example, Wikipedia 
editors have rules governing both the argumentational practice to be followed within 
Wikipedia articles, and that to be employed in discussing those articles (Butler et al. 
2008, p. 1103). This example also reinforces an observation made in Section One. 
Participants in practices that tolerate the more extreme sorts of argumentational behaviour 
do not always argue in such a manner: they are (mostly) just as capable of participating in 
more conventional argumentational practices. Switching between communities of 
argumentational practice restricted to the same dialogue type may be less clear-cut. The 
spread of Godwin’s Law beyond the internet-based communities in which it originated 
shows how horizontal transfer may occur between communities of argumentational 
practice. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper I have sought to explore the usefulness of argumentation schemes in the 
individuation and classification of communities of argumentational practice. I have 
argued that it is possible to distinguish communities of arguers by tracking the schemes 
they employ, subject to several points of clarification that arose from the discussion of 
examples above. That is, a satisfactory account of a community of argumentational 
practice should itemize the schemes employed within the practice, but it should also:  
 
1. track frequency of use for the schemes (including those omitted altogether), 
paying particular attention to schemes whose use is disproportionate to that in 
comparable practices;  
2. record information, explicit or tacit, about preferences amongst the 
community with regard to specific schemes;  
3. relate each scheme to the context(s) of dialogue employed by the community;  
4. where possible, observe how the practice changes with time.  
 
These goals raise significant methodological issues. The task will be constrained by the 
source of data, whether historical or empirical. I have suggested that the ideal source 
would be a participant in the practice, although that also raises issues of objectivity. 
Furthermore, there is the question of how schemes are to be extracted from practice. We 
have seen that mere admissibility, in which the schemes are those consistent with 
recorded practice, or even those which participants can be persuaded to accept, is 
insufficient. The schemes must arise in unprompted use. Further progress on these 
questions will require a more extensive study of a wider range of examples. 
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